Financing Agriculture in a Period of Stress by Lee, Warren F.
FINANCING AGRICULTURE IN A PERIOD OF STRESS 
by 
Warren F. Lee* 
The U.S. economy is generally prosperous and healthy but the agricultural 
sector continues to languish in a deep recession that began in 1981. Most of 
the nonfarm sectors are characterized by high profts, and low rates of 
unemployment and inflation. Persistent high real interest rates and a worri-
some federal budget deficit are the only clouds in this otherwise bright 
picture, and while these problems have received a lot of press, they really do 
not seem to be directly affecting enough people to mobilize a meaningful 
response in Washington. In this paper, I will review the evidence on 
financially stressed farmers, review policy proposals and explore solutions. 
Incidence of Financial Stress 
Financial stress can be defined as a perceived inability to meet near-
and longer term cash flow commitments. Current financial stress affects those 
farmers and farm lenders who entered into contractual agreements prior to 1981 
on the expectation that farm incomes and asset values would continue to rise, 
and that real interest rates would remain low. None of these expectations were 
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fulfilled. Farm incomes have fallen, the nominal value of farm assets in Ohio 
has receeded, by more than 50 percent to its 1976 level and real interest 
rates remain high. Moreover, no one is forecasting any irrmediate relief. 
The U.S. Situation 
A March 1985, USDA report continues to be the most comprehensive 
analysis of farm financial stress. This report focused on the plight of 
679,000 "family-sized conmercial fariJII3," those with annual sales of $50,000 to 
$500,000. As of January 1985: 
--6.3 pecent (43,000) of these farms, owing 9.3 percent of total farm 
debt were technically insolvent (debt/asset ratios over 100 percent) 
--7.4 percent (50,000) farms, owing 11.1 percent of the debt, were 
moving rapidly toward insolvency (debt/asset ratios 70 to 100 percent) 
--20 percent (136,000) farms, owing 25.9 percent of the debt had serious 
financial problems (debt/asset ratios 40 to 70 percent), but will be able 
to survive a few more unfavorable years. 
---66.3 percent (450,000) farms, owing 17.9 percent of all farm debt had 
no apparent financial problems (debt/asset ratios under 40%). 
To summarize these stark conclusions, one-third of the nation's family-
sized coliiilercial farms have serious to extreme financial problems, and these 
farmers owe nearly half of the more than $200 billion total farm debt. If all 
U.S. census farms are included, about one-fifth have debt/asset ratios over 40 
percent and these farmers owe nearly three-fifths of the total farm debt. 
The Ohio Situation 
In most respects, the farm financial picture in Ohio rrdrrors the national 
situation fairly closely. A March 1985 survey revealed that among Ohio's 
approximately 22,000 family-sized commercial farms (gross sales exceeding 
$40,000 annually) 
---10% (2,200) were having extreme financial problems (debt/ asset ratios 
above 70%) 
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---19% (4,200) were having serious financial difficulties (debt/asset 
ratios of 40 to 70%) 
---71% (15,600) had no apparent financial problesm (debt/asset ratios 
under 40%). When all of Ohio's 90,000 census farms are included: 
---24% of all Ohio farmers with nonreal estate debt, and 16 percent of 
those with real estate loans were delinquent with their loan payments 
---3% (2,700) were involved in some type of legal action in connection 
with delinquent loans. 
---Nearly half of all Ohio farmers under age 45 have debt/asset ratios 
above 40%, compared to 16 percent of those 45-64 and 3 percent of those 
65 and over. 
---Ohio's larger farms are experiencing more stress. The proportion of 
farms with debt/asset ratios above 40 percent ranges from 12% of farms 
under 100 acres to 59% of farms with 750-1000 acres. 
--The proportion of all Ohio farmers with debt/asset ratios above 40 
percent varies from a low of about 20 percent in the East and Southeast 
parts of the state to a high of nearly 40 percent in the Southwest. 
Farm Lender Situations 
Nearly $120 billion of the over $200 billion in total U.S. farm debt is 
owed by financially troubled farmers (debt/asset ratios over 40%), and $40 
billion of this is owed by farmers with extreme financial problems (debt/asset 
ratios over 70 percent). 
To understand the impact of farm financial stress on farm lenders, one 
needs to recognize the following: 
---lenders themselves are very highly leveraged, with debt/asset ratios 
typically ranging from 90 to 95 percent. Their ability to absorb loan losses 
is very limited. 
---Farm loan losses in each of the past three years have exceeded the 
cumulative total losses in the past half century. Few lenders were equipped 
by training or experience to deal with the recent onslaught of delinquencies, 
foreclosures, bankruptcies, write-offs, and other loan workout situations. 
---Nonfarm loans are generally performing well,so the incidence of 
lenders' problems is directly proportional to the degree to which they 
specialize in farm lending. 
---Farm debt constitutes only 3 percent of total private and public 
sector debt in the U.S. It is very unlikely that the worsening farm credit 
problem will lead to a total collapse of our financial system. 
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Farm loan losses have been more than some farm lenders could bear. Of the 
95 U.S. commercial bank failures in the first three quarters of 1985, 48 were 
agricultural banks (with farm loans exceeding 17 percent of total loans). 
More than 400 other agricultural banks had delinquent loan volumes that 
exceeded their equity capital--an early indicator of eventual failure. 
To date, commercial bank failures have been limited primarily to small, 
independent, rural banks in the western Cornbelt. The largest volume of 
commercial bank farm loan losses has been reported in California, but these 
losses are being easily absorbed by large, statewide branch banks with 
diversified loan portfolios. The same situation applies to Ohio's larger 
banks, and the inpact of farm credit problems on smaller banks in Ohio is 
buffered by our diversified economy. 
The plight of the Farm Credit System (FCS) lenders has been regularly 
reported in the Wall Street Journal throughout 1985. Approximately $11 
billion (15 percent) of their combined $74 billion ag. loan portfolio is 
classified as "nonperforming" and by their estimate loan chargeoffs of $3 
billion are possible over the next three years. The system has received an 
emergency credit line from the federal government to preserve member capital 
and to meet cash flow obligations. 
The FCS lender's problems have been exacerbated by interest rate trends. 
The decline in interest rates in 1985 caused a more rapid decline in lending 
rates at commercial banks beca~~e they use marginal cost pricing while the FCS 
uses a less responsive average cost pricing formula. FCS lending rates were 
also affected by increased spreads to cover loan losses, and by the sharp 
increase in funding costs following the announcement that government assis-
tance would be needed. The differential between FCS and Treasury issues 
increased to over 100 basis points after the system requested assistance in 
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September, 1985. These loan pricing problems have ca~~ed an as yet unknown 
loss in loan volume to competitors. Generally, only the more creditworthy FCS 
members have been in a position to change lenders, so there has likely been a 
further erosion in FCS loan portfolio quality. 
Consistent with its role as the farm lender of last resort, the Farmers 
Home Administration (FmHA) has experienced increased lending and worsening 
delinquency problems in recent years. By mid-1985, 39 percent of FmHA 
borrowers nationwide (holding 27 percent of FmHA loan volume) were classified 
as delinquent. Five years ago, only 13 percent of FmHA borrowers (3.8% of 
the loan volume) were delinquent. This growth in FmHA lending activity and 
loan servicing was probably not accompanied by a proportionate increase in 
budget, although there seems to be less publicity about FmHA backlogs in 1985 
than in previous years. 
Comparatively little information is available on the situation of other 
farm lenders--life insurance companies, merchants, dealers and individuals. 
There is little doubt that these other lenders have also experienced large 
increases in loan servicing costs and loan losses. 
Impacts on Rural Communities 
The effects of the loss of sizeable numbers of farmers and substantially 
lower incomes for those who remain have spilled over into businesses and 
institutions in rural communities. A recent Iowa study identified the 
following impacts: 
---Reduced sales, profits and asset values and increased trade credit 
losses for agribusiness firms 
---Dramatic declines in retail sales and a sharp increase in small 
business failures 
---Outmigration and population losses 
---A declining tax base. 
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This study also noted that so far, the rural economy has been able to 
absorb a surprisingly high proportion of displaced farmers. Moreover, the 
current farm recession has probably only accelerated long term economic and 
deroographic changes in rural communities. However, the capacity of many rural 
communities to continue to absorb displaced farmers is limited. If the 
recession continues, we can expect more population losses, further declines 
in retail sales, more difficulties for agribusiness firms, declining school 
enrollments and disruption of other community organizations and institutions. 
Problems and Solutions 
U.S. agriculture is clearly an industry with excess capacity--too much 
land, machinery and labor relative to domestic and foreign demand. The 
downsizing that is taking place is reflected in the painful financial 
adjustments referred to earlier. 
Excess Capacity 
U.S. farmers responded dramatically in response to perceived world-wide 
food shortages in the 1970s. 
--harvested acreage of feed and food grains increased from 130 million 
acres in 1970 to 171 million acres in 1981. By 1984, harvested acreage 
had been reduced to 158 million acres, but further reductions, 25 to 30 
million acres by some estimates, are needed. 
--the excess capacity problem is compounded by continued advances in 
productivity. Recent developments in biotechnology promise further 
increases in productivity growth. 
Slow Demand Growth 
-The U.S. population growth rate is low and there are ongoing secular 
changes in U.S. food consumption patterns--less red meat and dairy 
products, fewer calories and more fruits, vegetables, poultry and 
seafood. The demand for livestock feed grains will be stagnant. 
--Export demand is down. In many developing countries, lower economic 
growth rates and burdensome debt loads have reduced their effective 
demand for U.S. agricultural exports. Moreover, there is increased 
export competition from countries such as Agentina, Australia, Canada and 
the EEC. Some former food importing countries, Olina, Thailand, India, 
for example, are now net food exporters. 
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High Debt Carrying Costs 
--Agriculture is a capital intensive industry and U.S. farmers borrowed 
heavily in the 1970s when asset values were rising and real interest 
rates were low. Now, asset values are falling and real interest rates 
tripled--from about 3 percent to nearly 9 percent between 1979 and 1984. 
--Higher interest rates have raised debt servicing costs, increased 
production costs and supported a strong U.S. dollar which in turn has 
stifled farm exports. 
Declining Farm Asset Values 
--Nationwide, farm land values have fallen more than 18 percent since 
their 1982 peak. In some areas land values have fallen as much as 60 
percent. 
--Declining asset values are a necessary part of the downsiz1ng of 
American agriculture. Farm asset values will continue to decline until 
current and expected returns to investments in agriculture are 
competitive with other investments. 
-The financial condition of highly leveraged farming operations will 
continue to deteriorate, a growing number will be forced out of business 
and farm lenders will continue to experience historically high levels of 
loan losses. 
Remedial Policies 
National Economic Policies 
It is generally agreed that agriculture would benefit from a lower 
federal budget deficit and less restrictive monetary policies. These in turn 
would reduce real interest rates. Lower real interest rates would: 
--reduce farm debt servicing costs 
--support farm asset values 
--lower the value of the dollar, giving increased competitiveness for 
U.S. farmers in export markets 
--improve the financial position of debtor nations and strengthen their 
effective demand for our food exports. 
Federal tax policies, as they affect agriculture, also need to be 
re-examined. Tax advantages such as cash basis accounting and development 
expense write-offs are used by farmers, and by growing numbers of nonfarmers 
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to shelter off farm incorne. Tax advantages have probably stimulated 
overinvestment in agriculture. The resulting overproduction has contributed 
to downward pressure on commodity prices. 
Ironically, the tax laws work to the disadvantage of financially pressed 
farmers who are forced to liquidate assets. Liquidating assets may appear to 
be a solution to reduce debt loads and improve cash flows; however, there are 
several tax disincentives to this strategy, including depreciation and 
investment credit recapture, capital gains tax, alternative minirrnwn tax, 
acceleration of estate tax installment obligations and estate tax use valua-
tion recapture. These provisions apply in voluntary as well as forced 
liquidations, and many fanners going through foreclosures and bankruptcies 
potentially face substantial federal income tax liabilities. 
Agricultural Policy 
National economic policies probably have a greater impact on agriculture 
than do agricultural policies per se. Nevertheless, agricultural policy 
changes are needed to balance supply and demand and to regain competitiveness 
in world markets. These include: 
--A transition to a more market-oriented price policy 
--Direct government payments to replace cash receipts lost through lower 
commodity prices to ease the transition 
--Remove fragile land from production 
Other National Policies 
Given a mature domestic market and continued productivity growth, 
agriculture's future fortunes will depend on expanded export markets. Toward 
this end the following policies have been recommended. 
---A more aggressive trade policy, including elimination of nontariff 
barriers, increased export credits and credit guarantees and long-term 
food-aid programs 
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---Value-added export initiatives. Increased export sales of processed 
or prepackaged products would help to stabilize demand and increa~e domestic 
job formation. 
---Demand growth initiatives in low and middle income developing 
countries where population growth rates and income elasticities are high. 
--Strategic growth initiatives in the fonn of long-term aid to stii1Rllate 
economic development in low income countries with strong potential demand for 
our agricultural exports. 
Credit Policy 
Farm credit problems are a symptom of a more deeply rooted farm 
income problem. Nevertheless, farm credit problems are real and highly 
visible. 'Ibousands of farmers cannot meet scheduled loan payments, and 
hundreds of agricultural lending institutions are failing. As a result, farm 
credit policies are emerging at both the state and federal levels, and as the 
farm recession continues, more policies will be forthcoming. 
The rationale for special credit policies is that we need to "buy time" 
for financially pressed farmers and lenders. Help is justified, it is argued, 
because many U.S. farmers are innocent victims of "bad" fiscal, monetary and 
agricultural policies. Even if needed changes in national economic, agri-
cultural, export and other policies were implemented now, there would be only 
a gradual, long-term recovery in agriculture. Interim credit policies are 
needed now to stabilize farm asset values, to slow the exodus of financially 
stressed operators and to preserve the agricultural credit delivery system. 
To achieve these objectives, the following policies/programs have been 
implemented or proposed: 
-An "Agricultural Credit C'.orporation" or "Agricultural Conservation 
Corporation"-a temporary government entity that would hold delinquent loans 
and farm assets with unduly depressed values until prosperity is restored. 
--Lower interest rates through federal and state programs and agencies 
such as FmHA limited resource loans, interest buy downs, linked deposits, 
Aggie bonds, etc. 
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--Foreclosure moratoria, credit mediation, Ch. 11 Bankruptcy and other 
legal approaches to delay forced liquidation and exit. 
--Direct government aid for failing financial institutions to reduce 
lending costs and stabilize financial markets. 
--More government loan guarantees on farm loans, generally accompanied by 
writedowns or setasides. 
Worthy intentions notwithstanding, these federal and state credit 
policies are likely to fall far short of solving the farm credit problem. The 
problem is simply beyond the scope of anything other than massive amounts of 
government aid. Nearly $40 billion of the nation's total farm debt is owed 
by farmers who are technically insolvent, or moving rapidly toward in-
solvency. Corresponding data for Ohio indicate that about $1 billion in farm 
debt is owed by farmers who are technically insolvent, or nearly so. Loan 
losses on these farms could amount to as much as $20 billion nationwide ($500 
million in Ohio) as these severely stressed operations are restructured and/or 
liquidated over the next several years. 
Recommendations 
Policy deliberations should focus on the farm income problem and not 
merely the symptom, the farm credit problem. The farm income problem is 
largely a national problem that requires national policy responses. The 
citizens of Ohio must support constructive fiscal, monetary and other national 
policies needed to restore economic viability to our agricultural sector. 
Policy deliberations should also focus on two groups of farmers--those who can 
survive, and those who cannot. Most family-sized commercial farmers who are 
technically insolvent, or nearly so will be forced to leave agriculture, 
sooner or later. These people need relocation benefits, retraining, counsel-
ing, legal guidance and other support services to ease the financial and 
personal problems associated with this transition. A legal process for 
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addressing these situations exists. Foreclosure moratoria would merely 
forestall the inevitable, usually at the expense of both borrowers and 
creditors. 
Most farmers will survive the 1980s recession, but many in this group 
need education and training to develop the managerial skills needed to survive 
and grow in an uncertain business environment. These skills include record 
keeping, financial analysis, commodity marketing and risk management. 
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